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Abstract
The rise of “fake news” has become a major concern
for social media platforms. In response, Facebook has
proposed and tested the idea of users flagging and
rating news articles and sources, much akin to how
consumers rate products and services on the Internet.
One obvious challenge with this crowdsourced rating
approach is whether the users really know enough to
rate news articles and sources. Perhaps, a side benefit
of asking users to evaluate an article—and asking about
their personal experience with the event described in the
article—is making them realize that they do not know
enough about the event to make an accurate judgment,
thus pushing them to become more skeptical. We asked
68 social media users to assess the believability of 42
social media headlines. We found that, while users were
generally more likely to believe articles that agreed with
their point of view, asking users to rate pushed them to
think more critically about the truthfulness of the
articles. Moreover, once users had been asked to rate
some articles, they remained critical of other articles as
well, even without the rating prompt. Overall, our
findings suggest that asking users to evaluate the
truthfulness of articles may not only produce rating
information that can be a useful reference at a later
point in time but also have an immediate benefit of
alerting users to think more critically about all articles
they see.

1. Introduction
Fake news on social media rose to global attention in
2016 during the US presidential election, where
disinformation campaigns to influence the election
results were widespread [2, 3, 37]. About 60% of adults
get news from social media (primarily Facebook), and
the proportion is increasing [15], suggesting that the
problem will likely worsen [34]. In addition, past
research shows that users are poor at assessing whether
a news story on social media is real or fake [39] because
confirmation bias leads them to believe articles that
align with their a priori beliefs and disbelieve those that
do not [25]. As a result, more fake news articles are
shared on social media than real news [39], and fake
news also spreads faster than real news [47].
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The prevalence of fake news has not only shaken the
public’s trust in journalism but also stirred up criticism
towards social media platforms for not taking more
proactive actions to stop the spread of fake news [3]. In
2017, Facebook tried flagging fake news articles based
on user reports—which were reviewed by third-party
fact-checking organizations—but this proved to be
ineffective and was later removed [31]. In early 2018,
Facebook announced that it will adopt user ratings of
news sources—an Internet staple in determinations of
credibility, quality, and value [5]—following the route
of eBay and Yelp, which have users rate businesses [10]
or Amazon and BestBuy.com, which have users rate
products. However, a unique challenge in rating news
articles and sources is, do users know enough to rate
them? When users rate a business, it is expected that
they have actually used the business’ products or
services and thus have personal knowledge of it.
Credible reviews of products are grounded in actual
purchase and use of the product. How can users
accurately rate news sources unless they have been
personally involved with the news articles produced by
a news source? Without personal knowledge of the
events in a news article, users may lack the basis on
which to assess whether the news source has done a
good job in reporting on the events. Of course, the users
may attempt to aggregate knowledge from additional
news sources and references, but that level of
knowledge is still one level below personal experience;
they still have no direct personal knowledge of the
validity of the report. Combine this lack of personal
experience together with common biases and noise, user
ratings may pose a serious challenge in producing useful
information that could help other users assess the
credibility of news sources.
Perhaps therein lies a potentially unintended positive
consequence. Although there may be several hurdles we
must cross before user ratings are able to help other
users who would consume the rating information, could
prompting users to evaluate the truthfulness of
articles—and asking them about their personal
knowledge of the events described in the articles—help
those same users who are providing the ratings? Will
being asked to deliberately form a judgment about the
credibility of a news article induce users to think more
carefully about whether a social media article is true or
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fake? Some users may give little thought to rating and
simply provide the first assessment that comes to mind.
Other users may pause and realize that they actually
have no direct way to assess the credibility of a news
article—unless, of course, they have personally
experienced the reported event or done extensive
unbiased research—and this may cause them to be a bit
more skeptical of the articles they see, both those they
are asked to rate, as well as those they are not.
In this paper, we investigate whether asking users to
rate the credibility of articles they see influences their
assessment of those articles, and whether this spills over
to influence how credible they perceive other articles to
be on social media. Our results show that, while users
are still susceptible to confirmation bias, prompting
them to evaluate the truthfulness of the articles nudges
them to think more critically. We also found support for
a carry-over effect; once users are asked to rate some
articles, they remain critical toward other articles as well
even without the rating prompt. How Facebook can
aggregate potentially biased user ratings and present the
information in an effective way remains an open
question. Still, our work suggests that prompting users
to evaluate the articles themselves may be effective in
helping users to think more critically about the articles
they see on social media.

2. Prior Theory and Research
Fake news has been defined as “news articles that are
intentionally and verifiably false and could mislead
readers” [2]. Disinformation and fake news have long
been a problem, but fake news on social media became
an important societal issue when it was reported that
Russian intelligence agencies used social media to
propagate fake news in an attempt to influence the 2016
presidential election in the United States [2, 3]. In
response to fake news, a number of fact-checking
initiatives have been launched [16, 29], and fact
checking has been shown to influence the perceived
credibility of an author or an article [48], though the
issue is fact-checking articles in a timely manner before
any fake news can spread and cause damage. Factchecking has traditionally been done by experts (e.g.,
PolitiFact), and Facebook’s fake news flag also
leveraged expert fact-checking in addition to user
reports.
An alternative solution to expert fact-checking is to
have users rate the credibility or truthfulness of news
articles and/or news sources. Just as eBay has users rate
individual transactions that are aggregated into an
overall seller rating, social media platforms could have
users rate individual news articles which would then be
aggregated to provide an overall news source rating.
Alternately, users could be asked to rate the news source

directly, without consideration of a specific news article.
These source ratings would then be applied to articles
when they are first published, the same way that sellers
on eBay and other e-commerce sites have their ratings
applied to all new products they offer for sale. Research
shows that source ratings influence the extent to which
users believe social media stories [25] and influence
online news consumption [4].
Prior research on fact checking and news source
ratings has focused on the end result of fact checking
and ratings (e.g., whether social media users’ beliefs
about article credibility are influenced by fact-checking
reports or ratings [48]). However, one unanswered
question is whether—and how—asking a user to
evaluate articles affects the user doing the assessment.
Does the act of rating induce greater skepticism? Does
it influence users to pause from undiscerningly going
through articles and to view them with more critical
eyes? We begin by considering how users process
information on social media and the cognitive process
that takes place when users are prompted to evaluate
articles.

2.1. Information processing in social media
People use the Internet for many different purposes,
such as accomplishing tasks or seeking hedonistic
pleasure [49]. Most individuals use social media for
hedonistic purposes [18], such as seeking entertainment
or connecting with friends [23], rather than utilitarian
purposes, such as completing work tasks. Individuals in
a hedonistic mindset may be less likely to consider
information critically than those with a utilitarian
mindset, as their consumption is tied to enjoyment and
pleasure [19].
Facebook strives to maximize user enjoyment;
therefore, its algorithms are designed to identify and
display content that matches the users’ preferences, so
users are likely to see articles that align with their
existing beliefs [44]. Such a process causes a decrease
in the range of information that the users encounter, and,
as a result, Facebook users often exist in information
“bubbles”—also referred to as echo chambers [4]—that
reinforce their beliefs and make them believe that others
around the world are more like them [44]. Therefore,
many articles that users encounter on social media are
related to topics that users have previously viewed [44]
and have already formed an opinion about.
Humans have two very different cognitive processes
[24]. Many dual process models have been posed under
a host of different names; see Evans [11] for an analysis.
In this study, we adopt the commonly used terminology
of Keith Stanovich [41] and Daniel Kahneman [24],
who call these two distinct cognitive processes System
1 and System 2 cognitions. System 1 cognition is
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automatic and runs continuously,
involuntarily
providing us with conclusions without our conscious
thought [24]. System 1 cognition is our ‘fast thinking,’
where our simple heuristics produce perceptions and
actions in less than a second [24]. System 1 is our
intuitive decision making system [1]; when we have an
intuition or a “gut reaction,” that is System 1 talking.
The quick nature of System 1 is what enables us to do
intuitive tasks without direct thought, such as walk, talk,
recognize faces, and effortlessly retrieve certain facts
from memory [24].
However, System 1 comes with certain drawbacks.
When we process information using System 1, we only
use the information immediately at hand with the
vividness and saliency of available information driving
our decisions, rather than a more nuanced and carefully
considered model [6, 24]. The associative memory
processing of System 1 is strongly influenced by
framing [17], because it quickly searches for confirming
evidence of the question posed. The questions “Is Pat
friendly?” and “Is Pat unfriendly” are fundamentally
different questions because they trigger our System 1 to
retrieve entirely different instances of Pat’s behavior
[24]. As long as we can form the information into a
coherent story—right or wrong—we are likely to follow
our immediate System 1 response [24].
The second process is System 2, which involves a
more effortful, deliberate cognition [24]. System 2, or
“slow thinking,” takes much more time to arrive at a
conclusion and is laborious [24, 27]. We have
physiological symptoms that show the effort involved in
the process: our pupils dilate, the heart rate changes, the
blood pressure rises, and extra blood flows to different
areas of the brain that are active [24]. Examples of
System 2 processing are doing a standardized
computation that requires holding numbers in working
memory, monitoring the appropriateness of our
behavior in tense social situations, comparing two
products for value, and checking the validity of a
complex argument [32].
Because System 2 cognition requires more effort
than System 1 cognition, humans are predisposed to
avoid System 2 unless there is a need for it [24, 42]. We
usually adopt the perceptions and actions produced by
System 1 unless we are motivated to invest effort, or our
System 1 warns us that something is wrong its result
through feelings of unease [24].
When users encounter information that aligns with
their pre-existing opinions, their System 1 produces an
instant confirmation that the information is sensible, and
the users are inclined to believe it [9, 26, 33]. When
users encounter information that is contrary to their
opinions, their System 1 instantly produces a negative
reaction because the information does not align with
what System 1 knows to be true, resulting in cognitive

dissonance [13]. When an individual is presented with
two contradictory facts, both of which are plausible
(e.g., John is honest, but a story says he lied), he/she
must resolve the inconsistency. This can be done either
by concluding that the two facts are not contradictory
(e.g., John lied, but he is still honest because lying is not
related to honesty) or by accepting one and rejecting the
other (e.g., John is honest, and thus, I do not believe he
lied; or John lied, and thus, I do not believe he is honest)
[13].
Resolving such a cognitive dissonance takes
cognitive effort, and humans tend to be cognitive misers
who resist invoking System 2 and expending effort [40].
This tendency is exacerbated when humans are in a
hedonistic mindset [19]. Because rejecting the new
information is simpler cognitively than reassessing
one’s pre-existing opinions, most people accept their
System 1 instant conclusion; they retain their existing
opinion and discard the new information as being false
[9, 26, 30]. This tendency to favor information that
confirms one’s pre-existing opinions and ignore
information that challenges them is called confirmation
bias [9, 26, 33]. Thus, people are more likely to believe
information that matches their pre-existing opinions
(i.e., attitude homophily or alignment [2, 20]). Past
research shows that confirmation bias has a significant
effect on the belief in articles posted on social media
[25].
In summary, we theorize that when a user views a
news article on social media, their System 1 cognition
will produce an instant assessment of the believability
of the article based on its alignment with their prior
opinions on the topic. The context of social media is an
important one to study, as the influence of confirmation
bias while in a hedonistic mindset has not been
thoroughly studied, especially with the potential for
confirmation bias on social media to grow, causing real,
demonstrable changes to our political landscape [39,
45]. Social media users are usually in a hedonistic
mindset, so they are unlikely to invest the effort needed
to invoke System 2 cognition to override their System 1
results. The net effect is a belief that is heavily
influenced by prior opinions. Therefore:
H1: Pre-existing opinions on a topic directly influence
the extent to which a news headline is perceived to be
believable.

2.2. User rating of news articles
Users are commonly asked to rate products and services
on the Internet. Though some ratings are fake, our focus
in this paper is on ratings produced in good faith. When
we ask users to rate products or services, we expect them
to have used the product or service. When users are
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prompted to rate, they consider their own experiences
and draw upon those experiences to produce the rating.
Now, consider ratings of news articles. Unless the
user was actually involved in the events described in a
social media article (either as a participant or a witness),
the user has no personal experiences to draw upon.
Unless the user witnessed the event reported in the
article, he/she is incapable of providing a direct
assessment of its truthfulness because he/she has no
personal knowledge of the facts. Therefore, except in
very rare circumstances where the user was a participant
or witness of the events in the article, users will be
unable to provide a rating based on personal knowledge
of events, thus leading to divergent outcomes between
individuals in assessing credibility. Now, some users
may not have personal experience but are informed on
the topic and have triangulated information from various
sources. Others may accept the information based solely
on their System 1 conclusion on the information. In the
case of fake news articles that are complete fabrications,
there are no actual events that anyone could have
witnessed! The onus is then on individual user to decide
to “look into” the issue, accept the article as fact, or
reject the article.
We theorize that when users are asked to rate the
truthfulness of an article based on their personal
experience, they will recognize that they have no
personal knowledge on which to base a rating. Since not
all users will recognize this without an appropriate
prompt, we propose a rating intervention that will
explicitly ask users if they have personal knowledge of
the events. This explicit question will trigger the
recognition from users that they lack the knowledge
needed to rate the truthfulness of the article and may
result in deeper processing of the underlying issue.
As argued in H1, when users first see an article, their
System 1 will produce an instant assessment of its
believability based on confirmation bias. When users
are then asked to provide a truthfulness rating that asks
about personal knowledge of the event reported in the
article, their System 1 will produce an instant answer
that the user has no such knowledge of the event.
There are several events that can trigger System 2
cognition, and one of the most powerful is a discrepancy
from normal expectations [14, 28]. When System 1
detects that something is not normal, it produces a low
“Feeling of Rightness” (FOR) that indicates something
is amiss [7, 46]. A low FOR is an alert that System 1
believes that System 2 cognition should be invoked for
a deeper thinking. We theorize that when an individual’s
System 1 is asked whether the user has personal
knowledge of the events in the article and returns a
negative answer, it will produce a low FOR, which
would invoke System 2 cognition.
Different individuals may choose to respond to a low

FOR in different ways. Some individuals may have a
high need for cognition and therefore engage System 2
in situations when the FOR is only slightly low, while
others may be reluctant to engage in System 2 cognition
even when the FOR is very low [12, 22]. Empirical
evidence suggests that most people’s System 1 is
relatively good at producing an accurate FOR [22].
Whether System 2 is invoked or not depends on the
individual’s personality, though a low FOR will be
sufficient to invoke at least some amount of System 2
cognition under normal conditions [22]. These users’
System 2 cognition will realize that they lack direct
knowledge of the events in the story and thus cannot
produce a truthfulness rating that is based on their own
experiences as they would a product or service they have
used.
Instead, they will realize that any initial assessment
of truthfulness will be based on their perception of the
credibility of the article’s source and/or on the fit of the
article’s content with their prior opinions and indirect
knowledge about what is true or false. Both of these are
weaker criteria than the individual’s own direct personal
knowledge. Thus, users who invoke their System 2
cognition will be less certain of the accuracy of their
truthfulness assessment. They will be less likely to
believe the news article. As mentioned before, this
effect will be most pronounced for fake articles, which
is where we most need it to address the issue of
misinformation.
An alternate mechanism for the decreased
perception of believability of an article comes from
increased mindfulness caused by our prompt to rate
some headlines. Research on mindfulness suggests that
IT mindfulness can be manipulated [43]. The most
influential dimension of mindfulness in this research is
the “orientation in the present” dimension. Once users
become aware that information on social media may be
false, they become more mindful of the potential fiction
of the news that they see.
In summary, we argue that changing the design of
the current Facebook newsfeed will encourage critical
thought. Specifically, asking users to evaluate a news
article in a way that causes them to consider if they have
personal knowledge of the events in the article will
trigger a recognition that they do not have direct
personal knowledge of the article and thus cannot
provide an independent rating. This recognition will
increase the likelihood that users will engage in System
2 cognition to assess the article, and the resulting
uncertainty will reduce the extent to which they believe
the article. Thus:
H2: Asking users to rate a news headline will reduce the
extent to which they perceive it to be believable.
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The arguments above consider the direct effects of
being asked to rate an article on the believability of that
specific article, but are there carry-over effects? Does a
simple design change on one article influence
believability of future articles? Once a user realizes that
he or she lacks the personal knowledge needed to rate
an article, will this realization carry over to the articles
that follow, regardless of whether the user is asked to
rate them or not? Once an individual realizes that he or
she lacks the direct personal knowledge to rate a specific
article, the individual may generalize this realization to
all articles that do not concern the individual’s own life.
This realization cannot be “unlearned,” so once
internalized, it will become part of the normal
assessment of future articles. Thus, once the user has
some experience with being asked to rate articles (and
realizing that he or she lacks personal knowledge), then
he or she will be less likely to believe any future articles
(whether asked to rate or not) because the user will
recognize the basis on which one’s belief is formed is
less certain than a normal assessment. Thus:

on Facebook, some with the user-rating treatment and
some without (see Figure 1).
Table 2: Examples of news headlines used in the
experiment
- Robert Mueller Encouraged to Resign over Affair with
Nancy Pelosi
- NFL Players Union Votes to Encourage Kneeling
During National Anthem
- Nancy Pelosi Said Building a Wall Will Violate Rights
of 'Millions of Illegals'
- Melania Trump Bans White House Staff from Taking
Flu Shot
- Senator Tom Cotton Called for Drug Testing for
Social Security Recipients
- Trump's Doctor Said the President Was 'Too Sick to
Talk to Mueller'

H3: There will be a carry-over effect such that, once
users have been asked to rate some headlines, they will
be less likely to perceive any headlines as believable.

3. Methodology
3.1. Participants
We recruited a total of 68 undergraduate participants
from a large business core course. All were between the
age of 18 and 24, and about 35% of them were female.
We also collected Facebook usage and political
affiliation information; see Table 1.
Table 1: Participant group description
Categories
Percentage
Once a week or less
22%
Facebook
More than once a week
47%
Use
More than once a day
31%
Democrat
18%
Political
Moderate/Independent
57%
Affiliation
Republican
25%

3.2. Task

Figure 1: An example of a news headline (with the
user-rating treatment in the dotted box)

The participants viewed 42 news headlines and reported
the believability of each article. Of the headlines, 16
were designed to appeal to politically left-leaning
participants and 16 to right-leaning participants (see
Table 2 for examples). There were also 10 that may be
of special interest to our participants because of the
locality of the issues the headlines described. All the
headlines were formatted as they might appear as posts

The headlines and images were designed to avoid
major differences in the type and magnitude of feelings
they would generate. We used a gender-neutral name for
the person posting—not to be confused with the original
source who authored the article—and the comment from
the person posting was a summary of the headline itself.
To minimize any news source specific effect (e.g., some
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sources well-known and trusted by some users while
other sources are not), we fabricated a source name that
sounded plausible (NewsUnion.com). The URL was
verified to be inactive prior to the experiment (i.e., not
used by any news provider or anyone else).

3.4. Independent variables

3.3. Treatments
This is a repeated measures study in which
participants received all 42 headlines. Participants
received both the control condition (no user-rating) and
the experimental treatment (with user-rating and norating intermixed). The headlines were randomly
assigned to treatments and presented in random order
within treatment to control for any headline- and imagespecific effects. In a repeated measure design, there is a
concern about the effects of an early treatment bleeding
over into a later treatment [21, 36]. This is usually
controlled by random treatment order or a fully crossed
design in which all treatments orders are used equally,
except in cases where there are likely to be meaningful
theoretical differences in the bleed-over between
treatments. This is the case in our study. The control
condition is the current Facebook format, so it is
unlikely to influence later treatments because it is the
normal interface that users regularly use. In contrast, the
user-rating treatment is likely to have strong influence
on the treatments that follow it, because once users are
asked to rate an article, we theorize that they will
become more discerning in their consumption of
articles; see H3. Thus, randomizing the order of
appearance of the rating manipulation and controls
would confound the later treatment.
Therefore, the control condition was always
presented first, followed by a description of the userrating treatment, followed by the user-rating treatment.
The overall flow of the experiment is shown in Figure
2. As a robustness check, we also test for any ordering
effect that may stem from our experiment design; see
our results section.
Initial
Survey

To test for the carry-over effect (H3), as well as for
the user-rating effect (H2), the remaining 28 headlines
were randomly presented with or without the user-rating
treatment.

Control
Condition

User-Rating
Treatment*

*

Headlines with or without the user-rating treatment
were randomly displayed to test the carry-over effect.
Figure 2: Sequence of the experiment
Participants completed an initial survey for
demographic information. The first treatment was the
control condition (no user ratings) designed to mimic
the current Facebook style of presentation as closely as
possible. This treatment had 14 randomly assigned
headlines.

Confirmation bias was assessed using two items that
were self-reported by participants [25]. The first was the
participant’s position on the headline ( 3= extremely
negative to 3= extremely positive). The second was
the participant’s perceived importance of the headline
(using a 7-point scale: Do you find the issue described
in the article important? 1= not at all, 7= extremely). In
other words, the former represents the direction of
confirmation bias whereas the latter represent the
magnitude. Putting the two together, we are able to
measure the degree of fit between a headline and a
participant’s prior position. The two items were
multiplied together to form our Confirmation Bias
variable, which ranges from 21 to +21. This was used
to test H1.
To test our hypotheses, we indicated which articles
were displayed with the user-rating prompt (User
Rating), and which were displayed without it but after
our participants had been exposed to the rating prompt
(After Exposure Without Rating). These headlines
appeared exactly as those in the control condition. The
former variable was to test H2, whereas the latter was to
test H3.
Finally, we also controlled for our participants’
demographic factors such as gender, Facebook usage
level, and political affiliation.

3.5. Dependent variable
The believability of each article was measured using
three 7-point items (How believable do you find this
article, How truthful do you find this article, How
credible do you find this article) [25]. Reliability
(Cronbach's alpha) was 0.96, which is adequate.

4. Results
To test our hypotheses, we performed multilevel mixedeffects linear regression with random intercepts in Stata.
The base case was the control condition. The results are
reported in Table 3.
H1 argued that confirmation bias has a positive
effect on the believability of articles. Table 3 shows that
confirmation bias has a significant positive effect. H1 is
supported.
H2 posited that user rating would affect
believability. Table 3 shows that User Rating has a
negative and significant effect on Believability,
indicating that the user-rating treatment influenced the
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participants to become more critical about the
truthfulness of the headlines they saw. We conclude that
H2 is supported.
We also hypothesized in H3 that user rating would
also have a carry-over effect. On Table 3, After
Exposure Without Rating variable measures this carryover effect, and it turns out to be negative and
significant. Hence, H3 is also supported. The difference
between the coefficient for After Exposure Without
Rating and that for User Rating is statistically
insignificant (χ 1
0.40, p 0.527), indicating that
the carry-over effect is as strong as the effect from the
rating prompt. We note that gender, Facebook usage
level, and political affiliation had no significant
influence on believability.
Table 3: Estimation Results for Believability1
Independent Variables
User Rating
0.358***
After Exposure Without Rating†
0.312***
Confirmation Bias
0.431***
Female
0.264
FB Use: More than once a week
0.054
FB Use: More than once a day
0.076
Democrat
0.171
Republican
0.211
†

After Exposure Without Rating refers to those headlines displayed
without asking users to rate them (i.e., the control condition) after a
headline asking users to rate it was presented.

We also included post hoc tests to provide robustness
checks for our results. As described earlier, we could not
adopt a fully crossed design in our experiment because
of the asymmetric bleed-over effect; placing any control
condition after the user-rating treatment is likely to
confound the later treatment. The sequence of our
experiment (Figure 2) may cast doubts as to whether our
findings stem from other ordering effects. For instance,
some may wonder whether users simply become more
skeptical the more articles they read. To test this, we
divided each treatment group into two parts—first half
of the headlines and second half—and compared
believability; see Figure 3.
7 headlines 7 headlines 14 headlines 14 headlines
Control
User-Rating
Condition
Treatment
(a)

(b)

Figure 3: Testing for ordering effect

As we can see from Table 4, though the effect of
confirmation bias was still very much present, there was
no evidence of any ordering effect. This conclusion was
consistent be it in the control condition group (see (a) in
Table 4) or the user-rating treatment group (see (b) in
Table 4). Hence, these tests further strengthen our
finding that it was the user-rating treatment that
influenced users to think more critically about the
truthfulness of the articles, not some other ordering
effect.
Table 4: Estimation Results for Believability
Independent
(a)
(b)
Variables
First Half
0.104
0.102
Confirmation Bias
0.339***
0.483***
Female
0.378*
0.213
FB Use: More
0.026
0.104
than once a week
FB Use: More
0.220
0.001
than once a day
Democrat
0.219
0.149
Republican
0.321
0.158

5. Discussion
From our analyses, we found that participants were
more likely to believe articles that they agreed with,
proving that confirmation bias is a significant factor that
amplifies the effect of fake news on social media. As a
possible remedy, our results show that prompting users
to evaluate the truthfulness of articles directly influences
the extent to which users believe articles on social
media. As theorized, the rating prompt was enough to
nudge users to think more critically about the articles by
gently asking them whether they really knew—from
personal experience—if the events described in the
articles were true or false. And once this critical filter
was activated, it stayed active even for articles without
the user-rating treatment. These findings are especially
relevant given Facebook’s recent decision to have users
to rate the credibility of articles [10]. Though knowledge
of external facts could influence believability, the
randomized experimental design in our study reduces
the potential negative influence of missing variable bias.
There are several arguments in favor of user-based
ratings. Developing ratings directly from users may be
easier than finding appropriate experts and
compensating them for their ratings. There are more
users available to rate articles than experts, and
voluntary ratings from consumers will cost nothing.
After all, that is how we do ratings on the Internet for

1

Confirmation Bias is standardized for all results.
***p ≤ 0.001, **p ≤ 0.01, *p ≤ 0.05.
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products and services. Facebook decided that this is
their next move [10], hopefully adding credibility to
news consumption by prioritizing articles from sources
that the users have deemed to be reputable.
Unfortunately, such crowdsourced rating approaches
also have several problems that need to be ironed out
before the rating methods can produce a useful reference
that can influence users’ behavior in a meaningful way
[8]. After all, while people rate products and services
based on their personal experience, the same cannot be
expected for news.
However, this very limitation of crowdsourced
rating of news—i.e., the lack of personal experience of
the events described in the news—may have a positive
upside. Our work shows that the prompt of asking users
to evaluate the truthfulness of the articles itself can
remind the users that they do not have the necessary
personal experience to judge whether the articles are
true or not, helping them to think more critically about
the articles. This effect is important because, as shown
in prior research [25], believability has strong effects on
the actions that users take, such as reading, liking,
commenting, and sharing. Just as sharing of articles
contributes to news—fake or not—going viral, clicking
the Like button or commenting on an article may also
spread the news farther and faster due to the appearance
of the post in other users’ news feeds. Hence, invoking
the critical filter in users’ minds—and encouraging them
to be more careful in their sharing of information—is an
important first step in tackling the issue of fake news.

5.1. Implications for future research
The prevalence of news consumption on social media
[15], combined with the hedonistic, entertainmentseeking goals of social media use [23] that trigger
confirmation bias, suggests that news consumption on
social media may not be mindful. Mindfulness can have
significant impacts on the way we use technology, for
better or worse. In this research, we begin to address the
issue of mindfulness in social media consumption. We
believe that asking users to evaluate articles is one step
towards inducing more mindful consumption, but more
research needs to be done on other ways to trigger a
more mindful behavior.
Largely, we can categorize the issues around the
rating approaches for the problem of fake news into the
production of ratings and the consumption of them. In
this paper, we focused on the production side of the
ratings and how the action of collecting the rating
information from users may actually influence their
behaviors.
We need more research on the production side of
ratings, the different procedures, and pros and cons
associated with those procedures. One fundamental

concern about crowdsourced ratings is that users may
lack the knowledge needed to verify the facts in articles
because they may not have personally witnessed the
events in the article. User ratings are common on the
web, and we generally accept them as somewhat reliable
indicators of underlying quality, but it is not entirely
clear whether this assumption is true, especially in the
context of news. Since most users simply lack the
expertise and experience to judge the truthfulness of
articles, the result may be articles rated by their fit with
users’ pre-existing beliefs and users being shown more
articles that fit their beliefs, causing the filter bubbles to
worsen.
Also, for crowdsourced ratings to be successful, the
level of participation is crucial. For product and service
ratings, consumers have various incentives to leave their
feedback. They feel invested as they have paid for the
products and services. However, unlike product and
service ratings where the process of rating is easier to
understand, news article ratings may not be as easily
understood. When fake news articles continually show
up, will the users’ participation in rating news stories
remain high or will the users feel flustered and develop
a sense of helplessness and stop contributing? If user
attrition is a concern, perhaps expert rating may be a
better solution in the long run.
Though we are mainly concerned with user article
rating in this paper, there may be many other ways of
collecting rating information. For instance, compared to
Facebook’s proposed user rating approach, expert rating
approaches have some obvious benefits [8]. Expert
ratings of articles (i.e., fact checking) are fairly well
understood with many services available (e.g.,
PolitiFact). Aggregating those services to produce
source level ratings is straightforward, though the
timeliness of the rating is still a concern.
On the consumption side of rating information,
given that there are different ways of producing source
ratings, we should investigate whether different rating
approaches have differing impacts on the users. If the
ratings came from regular users assessing older stories
(as Amazon and eBay for past purchases), would they
have a stronger or weaker effect on believability than
ratings from a panel of experts? If the ratings came from
the users, would the mechanisms of rating matter?
Would user ratings of the source be perceived
differently than user ratings of individual articles?
Would there be meaningful differences in how the users
interpret these ratings from different sources and
mechanisms? We need more research on ways to
compile and present ratings of social media stories.
Presentation format of rating information is also
important in influencing users’ behaviors. For instance,
Facebook had to roll back their flagging approach
because it proved to be ineffective. One possible reason
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is that the users simply did not understand what the flags
meant. If Facebook educated users on the flags (through
banners and TV campaigns), would they have been
more effective? What if the flags had a more eyecatching icon and stronger wording to trigger System 1
and 2 cognitions? Research has shown that users’
behavior may change even with a subtle change in the
interface, such as displaying the news source before the
headline [25]. Therefore, it is important to investigate
how the rating information should be presented to
maximize its influence on the users.
Another important implication from our research is
the role of confirmation bias. From Table 3, we see that
a one standard deviation change in confirmation bias
(which is standardized) has a larger effect than the userrating treatment. In other words, a user’s belief in a
social media article is influenced more by his/her desire
for it to be true than by the push from the rating prompt.
Fortunately, the rating prompt nearly compensates for
the influence of confirmation bias. In addition to
investigating other ways to help users think more
critically when consuming news on social media, we
need more research on confirmation bias and how it
affects our beliefs in news stories, especially fake news
stories.
Finally, in this work, we held constant the person
sharing the article with the participant. Would it matter
who shared the article and their relationship to the user,
who liked it, and how many people commented on it?
More research is needed to better understand how who
shares an article influences its believability and the
actions users take.

5.2. Implications for practice
The public is starting to recognize the role of social
media providers and search engine providers in the
spread of fake news and is calling for more proactive
measures. We approached the problem of fake news
from the opposite direction from many other
researchers, who have started by first building
prototypes and then testing if they affect believability
[35, 38]; we started by first testing if the prompt of
asking users to rate the articles they see on social media
would influence them to think more critically about the
truthfulness of those articles. In so doing, we aim to
provide evidence-based design advice.
As discussed earlier, figuring out how to make
crowdsourced rating is going to be challenging, and that
may be the basis to push for expert rating instead [8].
However, different rating methods need not be mutually
exclusive, and we can adopt different approaches
together (e.g., user rating with expert rating). Figuring
out the best way to collect and provide rating
information must be a long-term endeavor. However,

we find that user rating has a rather immediate benefit,
and it only requires a cosmetic change to the interface
which is likely to be low cost.
The key idea is to momentarily stop users from
mindlessly consuming news on social media by asking
them to evaluate the articles. Perhaps, other ways to stop
the stream of mindless consumption may also prove to
be effective. Currently, most of (if not all) Facebook
surveys and rating prompts (e.g., Would you
recommend this place?) do not come with any submit
button or confirmation prompt. All that users have to do
is to click on an option, and the response is submitted.
Following Facebook’s current practice, we also
designed this experiment in that fashion. However, if
there was an extra step that further prompted users to
think about their response (e.g., Are you sure?), it may
have a greater impact on the users’ behavior.
In this work, we investigated a possible positive side
effect in asking users to rate news articles on social
media. The jury is still out on whether such a
crowdsourced rating mechanism would be effective in
generating useful information for readers to evaluate the
truthfulness of the articles they see. That being said, our
work shows that there may be merits in asking users to
rate the news articles they see on social media. It is a
low hanging fruit that Facebook (and other social media
for that matter) may want to consider regardless of their
long-term plans and alternative options.
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